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Abstract. Due to major breakthroughs in software and engineering
technologies, embedded systems are increasingly being utilized in areas
ranging from aerospace and next-generation transportation systems, to
smart grid and smart cities, to health care systems, and broadly speaking
to what is known as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). A CPS is primarily
composed of several electronic, communication and controller modules
and some actuators and sensors. The mix of heterogeneous underlying
smart technologies poses a number of technical challenges to the design
and more severely to the verification of such complex infrastructure. In
fact, a CPS shall adhere to strict safety, reliability, performance and
security requirements, where one needs to capture both physical and
random aspects of the various CPS modules and then analyze their inter-
relationship across interlinked continuous and discrete dynamics. Often-
times however, system bugs remain uncaught during the analysis and
in turn cause unwanted scenarios that may have serious consequences
in safety-critical applications. In this paper, we introduce some of the
challenges surrounding the design and verification of contemporary CPS
with the advent of smart technologies. In particular, we survey recent
developments in the use of theorem proving, a formal method, for the
modeling, analysis and verification of CPS, and overview some real world
CPS case studies from the automotive, avionics and healthtech domains
from system level to physical components.
Keywords: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Formal Methods, Theorem Prov-
ing, Physical Systems, Hybrid Systems, Performance, Dependability
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical systems (CPS) [74] are engineered systems involving a cyber
component that controls the physical components, as shown in Figure 1. The
cyber elements include embedded systems and network controllers, which are
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usually modeled as discrete events. Whereas, the physical components exhibit
continuous dynamics, such as the physical motion of a robot in space or the
working of an analog circuit, and are commonly modeled using differential equa-
tions. CPS are capable of performing two main functionalities (a) constructing
the cyber space using intelligent data management, computational and analyti-
cal capabilities; and (b) real-time data acquisition from the physical world and
information feedback from the cyber space using some advanced connectivity, as
depicted in Figure 1. They can be small, such as artificial pancreas, or very large
and complex, such as a smart car or smart energy grid. The development of
powerful embedded system hardware, low-power sensing and widely deployed
communication networks has drastically increased the dependence of system
functionality on CPS. CPS are widely used in advanced automotive systems
(autonomous vehicles and smart cars), avionics, medical systems and devices,
optical systems, industrial process control, smart grids, traffic safety and control,
robotics and telecommunication networks, etc. For example, smart (self-driving)
cars are considered as a highly complex autonomous CPS composed of over one
hundred processors, and an array of sensors and actuators that interact with the
external environment, like the road infrastructure and internet.
Information
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Fig. 1. Components of a CPS [2]
The main goals for an efficient design of CPS are to co-design its cyber and
physical parts, and to engineer the system of systems involving the intrinsic het-
erogeneity. Moreover, an increase in the complexity of its various components
and the utilization of advanced technologies pose a major challenge for devel-
oping a CPS. For example, in the case of smart cars, it is required to develop
cost-effective methods ensuring: a) design and analysis (verification) of its var-
ious components at different levels of abstraction, i.e., at different systems and
software architecture levels; b) analyzing and understanding the interactions of
system of systems, e.g., cars’ control system and its various components, such
as engine, wheel, steering; c) minimizing the cost of the car by ensuring the
safety, reliability, performance and stability of the overall system. Thus, these
requirements have to be fulfilled for the efficient design and analysis of a CPS.
The analysis of CPS can generally be characterised as of three types, namely,
functional, performance and dependability analysis. For example, the functional
analysis involves the analysis of the physical, control and signal processing com-
ponents of CPS. Each of these characteristics also need to consider a hybrid
behavior incorporating both continuous and discrete dynamics, e.g., the physi-
cal and cyber elements of the underlying system.
Conventionally, CPS are analyzed using paper-and-pencil methods or computer-
based numerical and symbolic techniques. Moreover, most of the time is spent
on designing the life-cycle of CPS and their physical (dynamical) behaviour
needs to be manipulated. However, there is a lack of theoretical foundations for
CPS dynamics and compositional theories for the heterogeneous systems in the
tools associated with these analyses. Moreover, these analysis methods suffer
from their inherent limitations, like human-error proneness, discretization and
numerical errors and the usage of unverified simplification algorithms [23] and
thus cannot provide absolute accuracy of the corresponding analysis. Due to
the safety critical-nature of CPS, the accuracy of their design and analysis is
becoming a dire need. For example, the fatal crash of Uber’s self-driving car in
March 2018 that killed a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona, USA was found to be
caused by some sensor’s anomalies [1]. A more rigourous analysis of CPS could
have avoided this incident.
Formal methods [44] have been used as a complementary technique for ana-
lyzing CPS and thus can overcome the above-mentioned inaccuracy limitations
of the analysis. The two most commonly used formal methods are model check-
ing [14] and theorem proving [35]. Model checking is based on developing a state-
space based model of the underlying system and formally verifying the properties
of interest, specified in temporal logic. It has been used for analyzing several as-
pects of a CPS [21]. However, this kind of analysis involves the discretization
of the continuous dynamical models and thus compromises the accuracy of the
corresponding analysis. Moreover, it also suffers from the state-space explosion
problem [14]. Theorem proving [35] is a computer based mathematical method
that involves developing a mathematical model of the given system in an ap-
propriate logic and the formal verification of the properties of interest based on
mathematical reasoning within the sound core of a theorem prover. The involve-
ment of the formal model and its associated formally specified properties along
with the sound nature of theorem proving ensures the accuracy and complete-
ness of the analysis. Based on the decidability or undecidability of the underlying
logic, e.g., propositional or higher-order logic, theorem proving can be automatic
or interactive, respectively.
Many theorem provers, e.g., HOL4 [92], HOL Light [36], Isabelle [69], KeY-
maera [73], Coq [19], PVS [68] have been used for the formal analysis (formal
verification) of CPS, e,g., formal functional analysis, formal probabilistic and
performance analysis, formal dependability analysis, and hybrid analysis. For
instance, the KeYmaera theorem prover has been specifically designed for the
formal verification of hybrid systems, thus, incorporating both the continuous
and discrete dynamics of the underlying system. KeYmaera is based on deduc-
tive reasoning and computer algebraic prover technologies. It uses differential
dynamic logic for the model implementation and specification of the underlying
system, which is a first-order logic. Similarly, HOL Light provides an exten-
sive support of mathematical libraries that have been used for the functional
analysis, i.e., the verification of various continuous aspects of CPS, such as con-
trol systems, power electronics, electromagnetic, quantum and optical systems.
HOL4 and Isabelle theorem provers provide an extensive support for the for-
mal probabilistic and dependability analysis of systems. Likewise, Isabelle and
HOL4 have been extensively used for the verification of software components,
providing safety and security analysis of the underlying CPS. In this paper, we
report these developments that have been done for the modeling, analysis and
verification of CPS in these theorem provers.
2 Formal Functional Analysis
2.1 Verification of Physical Components
Hasan et al. [38] proposed a framework for analyzing the optical waveguides
using HOL4. In particular, the authors formally analyzed the eigenvalues for the
planar optical waveguides and utilized their proposed framework for analyzing
a planar asymmetric waveguide. Afshar et al. [5] developed a formal support for
the complex vector analysis using HOL Light and used it to formally verify the
law of reflection for the planar waves. Later, the authors used the formalization
of complex vectors to formalize the notions of electromagnetic optics [51], which
is further used for performing the formal analysis of the resonant cavity enhanced
photonic devices.
Siddique et al. [86] provided a formalization of geometrical optics using HOL
Light. The authors formalized fundamental concepts about geometrical optics,
i.e., ray, free space, optical system and its stability. Finally, they used their
proposed formalization to perform the stability analysis of the Fabry-Perot res-
onator with fiber rod lens [82]. Next, the authors extended their framework by
formalizing the ray optics of the cardinal points and utilized it for formally
analyzing a thick lens [87] and the optical instrument used to compensate the
ametropia of an eye [89]. Moroever, the authors formalized the notion of optical
resonators and used it for formally verifying the 2-D microresonator lattice opti-
cal filters [88]. Finally, the authors extended their formal support for geometrical
optics in HOL Light by performing the formal analysis of the gaussian [90] and
periodic [91] optical systems.
As a part of the optics formal verification project [6], Mahmoud et al. [60]
provided a support for the formal analysis of the quantum systems using HOL
Light. In particular, the authors formalized the infinite dimension linear spaces
and used it for formally verifying a quantum beam splitter. Next, the authors
used their formalization of linear algebra to formalize the optical quantum cir-
cuits, i.e., the flip gate and used it to formally verify the beam splitter and the
phase conjugating mirror [61]. Later, the authors also formalized the notion of
coherent light, which is a light produced by the laser sources and formally verified
its various properties using HOL Light [62]. Based on these findings, Beillahi et
al. [15] proposed a framework for the hierarchical verification of the quantum cir-
cuit and used it for the formal analysis of a controlled-phase gate and the Shors
factoring quantum circuits. Rand et al. [75] proposed a framework implement-
ing the QWIRE quantum circuit language in Coq, which accepts a high-level
abstract model of the quantum circuits and allows the verification of their prop-
erties using Coq’s features such as dependently-typed circuits and proof-carrying
code. Liu et al. [54] formalized the theory of Quantum Hoare Logic (QHL) and
used it for formally verifying the correctness of a nontrivial quantum algorithm
using Isabelle.
2.2 Verification of Software Components
The High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) research program [33]
was started by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in
the USA with an aim of creating a technology for constructing CPS that are
resilient against cyber-attacks, i.e., CPS providing an appropriate security and
safety properties. One of the major goals of this program is to create a high-
assurance software for vehicles, ranging from automobiles to military vehicles,
such as quadcopters and helicopters. As a part of this project, Cofer et al. [22]
proposed a formal approach for constructing a secure airvehicle software to en-
sure security against cyber attacks using Isabelle. Moreover, the authors applied
their proposed approach for formally analyzing the SMACCMcopter, which is
a modified commercial quadcopter, and Boeings Unmanned Little Bird (ULB),
which is a full-sized optionally-piloted helicopter. Klein et al. [52] presented the
formal verification of seL4 microkernel in HOL4, which is a third-generation
microkernel of L4 provenance. The authors formally proved that the implemen-
tation of the underlying system follows the high-level specification of the kernel
behaviour using Isabelle. Moreover, they also verified two vital properties of the
microkernel, i.e., 1) the kernel will not perform an unsafe operation; 2) it will
never crash.
2.3 Verification of Control and Signal Processing Components
Transform methods, such as Laplace, Fourier and z-transforms are widely used
for solving dynamical models and performing the frequency domain analysis of
systems. Generally, the dynamics of a system in frequency domain are charac-
terized by the transfer function and frequency response, providing a relationship
between its input and output and are important properties of the control and
signal processing components of a CPS. In this regards, Taqdees et al. [93] for-
malized the Laplace transform using multivariate calculus theories of HOL Light.
Moreover, the authors used their formalization of the Laplace transform for for-
mally verifying the transfer function of the Linear Transfer Converter (LTC)
circuit. Next, the authors extended their framework and provided a support to
formally reason about the linear analog circuits, such as Sallen-Key low-pass
filters [94] by formalizing the system governing laws such as Kirchhoff’s Current
Law (KCL) and Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (KVL) using HOL Light. Later, Rashid
et al. [81] proposed a new formalization of the Laplace transform based on the
notion of sets and used it for analyzing the control system of the Unmanned
Free-swimming Submersible (UFSS) vehicle [79] and 4-pi soft error crosstalk
model [76]. The Laplace transform [49,96] has also been formalized in Isabelle
and Coq theorem provers. Similarly, Rashid et al. [77] formalized the Fourier
transform in HOL Light and used it to formally analyze an Automobile Sus-
pension System (ASS), an audio equalizer, a drug therapy model and a MEMs
accelerometer [78].
To perform the transfer function based analysis of the discrete-time systems,
Siddique et al. [84] formalized z-transform using HOL Light and used it for
the formal analysis of Infinite Impulse Response (IIR) Digital Signal Processing
(DSP) filter. Later, the authors extended their proposed framework by providing
the formal support for the inverse z-transform and used it for formally analyzing
a switched-capacitor interleaved DC-DC voltage doubler [85]. Beillahi et al. [17]
proposed a formalization of signal-flow graph, which is widely used for evaluat-
ing the system performance in the form of transfer function, using HOL Light.
The authors used their proposed framework for formally analyzing a die design
process [16], 1-boost cell interleaved DC-DC, Pulse Width Modulation (PWM)
push-pull DC-DC converters [17], Double-coupler Double-ring (DCDR) photonic
processor [83], z-source impedance network and PANDA Vernier resonator [18].
Farooq et al. [32] proposed a formal framework for the kinematic analysis
of a two-link planar manipulator, which describes a geometrical relationship be-
tween the robotic joints and links, and is widely used to capture the motion
of the robots. Moreover, the authors performed the formal kinematic analysis
of a biped walking robot using HOL Light. Next, Affeldt et al. [4] carried for-
ward this idea and formalized the foundational support for 3D analysis of the
robotic manipulators in Coq. The authors used their proposed framework for
the kinematic analysis of the SCARA robot manipulator. Wu et al. [97] used
HOL4 to formally reason about the forward kinematics of the 3-DOF planar
robot manipulator. Similarly, Li et al. [53] provided the formal verification of the
Collision-free Motion Planning Algorithm (CFMPA) of Dual-arm Robot (DAR)
using HOL4. Walter et al. [95] formally verified a collision-avoidance algorithm
for service robots in Isabelle. The authors mainly formalized the safety zone of
the robot based on the algorithm and used it to formally verify that the robot
will stop upon facing an obstacle, otherwise, it will continue its movement within
the safety zone. Recently, Rashid et al. [80] provided the formal modeling and
analysis of the 2-DOF robotic cell injection systems using HOL Light.
2.4 Formal Hybrid Analysis
Platzer et al. [70] developed an algorithm for the verification of the safety prop-
erties of CPS. The authors used the notion of continuous generalization of in-
duction to compute the differential invariants, which do not require solving the
differential equations capturing the dynamics of CPS. Moreover, they used their
proposed algorithm for formally verifying the collision avoidance properties in
car controls and aircraft roundabout maneuvers [71] using KeYmaera. Similarly,
Platzer et al. [72] verified the safety, controllability, liveness, and reactivity prop-
erties of the European Train Control System (ETCS) protocol using KeYmaera.
KeYmaera has also been widely used for the dynamical analysis of various CPS,
such as a distributed car control system [59], freeway traffic control [67], au-
tonomous robotic vehicles [66] and industrial airborne collision avoidance sys-
tem [50]. Recently, Bohrer et al. [20] presented VeriPhy, a verified pipeline for
automatically transforming verified models of CPS to verified controller executa-
bles. It proves CPS safety at runtime by verified monitors. All these analysis
performed using KeYmaera are based on the differential dynamics logic, which
captures both the continuous and discrete dynamics of CPS and their inter-
action. This logic allows the suitable automation of the verification process as
well. Similarly, Foster et al. [34] proposed a framework for the verification of CPS
based on Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP) and Isabelle/HOL. In par-
ticular, the authors provide the implementation of designs, reactive processes,
and the hybrid relational calculus, which are important foundational theories for
analyzing CPS.
3 Formal Probabilistic and Performance Analysis
Hasan et al. [45] proposed a higher-order logic framework for the probabilistic
analysis of the systems using HOL4. The authors first formalized the standard
uniform random variable [39]. Next, they used this random variable alongside a
non-uniform random number generation method to formalize continuous uniform
random variables. Finally, the authors used their proposed formalization for the
probabilistic analysis of roundoff error in a digital processor [39]. Next, Hasan et
al. [41] used HOL4 for the formal verification of the expectation and variance of
the discrete random variable and used their expectation theory to formally rea-
son about the Coupon Collectors problem [41]. Later, the authors extended their
framework by providing the formal verification of the expectation properties of
the continuous random variables, i.e., Uniform, Triangular and Exponential [37].
Next, the authors formalized the indicator random variables using HOL4 and
used it for the expected time complexity analysis of various algorithms, i.e., the
birthday paradox, the hat-check and the hiring problems [42]. Elleuch et al. [30]
used the probability theory of HOL4 to formally reason about the detection
properties of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and a WSN-based monitoring
framework [31]. Moreover, the authors conducted the performance analysis of
WSNs [29]. Hasan et al. also used their probability theory in HOL4 for conduct-
ing the performance analysis of Automatic-repeat-request (ARQ) protocols, i.e.,
Stop-and-Wait, Go-Back-N and Selective-Repeat protocols [40]. Finally, Hasan
et al. [43] formalized the notion of conditional probability and formally verified
its classical properties, i.e., Bayes’ theorem and total probability law. The au-
thors utilized their formalization for formally analyzing the binary asymmetric
channel, which is widely used in communication systems. Mhamdi et al. [63]
formalized the Lebesgue integral using HOL4 and used it for formally verifying
the Markov and Chebyshev inequalities, and the Weak Law of Large Numbers
(WLLN) theorem. Next, the authors built upon Lebesgue integral to formalize
the Radon-Nikodym derivative and used it for formalizing the fundamentals of
information theory, i.e., Shannon and relative entropies [64]. Later, Mhamdi et
al. [65] used the probabilistic analysis support developed in HOL4 to evaluate
the security properties of the confidentiality protocols. A library for the formal
probabilistic analysis has also been developed in Isabelle. Holzl et al. [47] formal-
ized measure theory with extended real numbers as measure values, in particular,
the authors formalized Lebesgue integral, product measures and Fubinis theo-
rem using Isabelle. Eberl at al. [24] developed an inductive compiler, which takes
programs in a probabilistic functional language and computes density functions
for the probability spaces using Isabelle. Similarly, Holzl et al. [48] proposed a
formalization of Markov chains and used it to formally verify the ZeroConf and
the Crowds protocols using Isabelle.
4 Formal Dependability Analysis
Hasan et al. [46] formalized some fundamental concepts about the reliability
theory in HOL4 and used it for formal reliability analysis of reconfigurable
memory arrays in the presence of stuck-at and coupling faults. Moreover, the
authors performed the reliability analysis of the combinational circuits, such as
full adders, comparators and multiplier. Later, Abbasi et al. [3] extended the
reliability analysis framework by formally verifying some statistical properties,
i.e., second moment and variance and other reliability concepts, i.e., survival,
hazard and fractile functions. The authors utilized their proposed framework for
formally analyzing the essential electronic and electrical system components.
Liu et al. [56] proposed a framework to reason about the finite-state discrete-
time Markov chains using HOL4 and formally verified some of its properties
such as joint and steady-state probabilities, and reversibility. The authors uti-
lized their proposed framework to formally analyze a binary communication
channel and an automatic mail quality measurement protocol [58]. Next, the au-
thors formalized the discrete-time Markov reward models and used it to formally
reason about the memory contention problem of a multi-processor system [57].
Later, the authors proposed a framework to formally reason about the properties
of the Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) such as joint probabilities and formally
analyzed a DNA sequence [55].
Ahmad et al. [9] developed a higher-order logic based framework for the
formal dependability analysis using probability theory of HOL4. The proposed
analysis provides the failure characteristics of the systems, i.e., reliability, avail-
ability, maintainability, etc. The authors formalized the Reliability Block Dia-
grams (RBD) [11], which are the graphical representations providing the func-
tional behaviour of a system modules and their interconnections. The proposed
formalization of RBD has been used for formally analyzing a simple oil and
gas pipeline, a generic Virtual Data Center (VDC) [13], Reliable Multi-Segment
Transport (RMST) data transport, Event to Sink Reliable Transport (ESRT)
protocols [12] and Logistics Service Supply Chains (LSSCs) [10]. Similarly, Ah-
mad et al. [7] proposed a framework for the formal fault tree analysis using HOL4.
The authors formalized the fault tree gates, i.e., AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR
and NOT and formally verified their generic expressions for probabilities fail-
ures. Moreover, their proposed framework was used to perform the fault tree
analysis of a solar array, which is used as a major source of power in the Dong
Fang Hong-3 (DFH-3) satellite [7] and a communication gateway software for
the next generation Air Traffic Management System (ATMS) [8].
Elderhalli et al. [26] developed a higher-order logic based framework for the
formal dynamic dependability analysis using HOL4. The proposed analysis pro-
vides the dynamic failure characteristics of the systems, i.e., dynamic reliability
and fault trees, etc. The authors formalized the Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) [25]
and Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams (DRBD) [27] using HOL4. Moreover,
they used their proposed formalization for formally analyzing the Drive-by-wire
System (DBW), a Shuffle-exchange Network (SEN) and Cardiac Assist System
(CAS) [28].
5 Theorem Proving Support for CPS
Table 1 summarizes the formal libraries that are available in various theorem
provers for performing the formal analysis of CPS. For example, the formal sup-
port for the dependability analysis of systems is only available in HOL4. Sim-
ilarly, the libraries to formally reason about robotics and software components
are available in most of the theorem provers. KeyMaera provides a support for
formally analyzing the hybrid systems. Moreover, HOL4 and Isabelle theorem
provers have a quite dense library for probabilistic and performance analyses
of systems. Similarly, the transform methods are partially available in Isabelle,
Coq and HOL4 theorem provers, i.e., only the Laplace transform is formalized in
these theorem provers. However, HOL Light contains formal libraries for most of
the transform methods, i.e., Laplace, Fourier and z-transforms. Also, the formal
library for analyzing the optical systems is only available in HOL Light.
Analysis/Theorem Provers HOL4 HOL light Isabelle/HOL Coq PVS Keymaera
Transform Methods 3 3 3 3
Probabilistic Analysis 3 3
Performance Analysis 3 3
Dependability Analysis 3
Hybrid Systems 3
Optical Systems 3
Quantum Systems 3 3 3
Robotic Systems 3 3 3 3 3
Software Components 3 3 3 3 3
Table 1: Libraries for Formal Analysis in Major Theorem Provers
6 Conclusion
CPS are highly complex systems composed of actuators, sensors, and several elec-
tronic, communication and controller modules, and exhibit both the continuous
and discrete dynamics. Due to the safety critical-nature of CPS, their accurate
analysis is of utmost importance. This paper surveys some of the efforts that
have been done regarding the formal verification of CPS using theorem proving
by highlighting the aspects of CPS that have been verified using different theo-
rem provers. In this regard, only one dedicated theorem prover, KeYmaera, has
been developed for analyzing hybrid systems. However, we need to develop ded-
icated formal libraries in other theorem provers that can support the analysis of
hybrid systems, i.e., incorporating the interlinked discrete and continuous-time
features of a CPS simultaneously.
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